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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Better regulation and enterprise: the case of environmental health risk
regulation in Britain
Ian Vickers*
Centre for Enterprise and Economic Development Research, Middlesex University Business
School, London, UK
(Received 12 July 2007; final version received 30 January 2008)
Proposals for ‘better regulation’ and the policy dynamics behind them are
examined with respect to the implications for the regulation of environmental
health risks in smaller enterprises in Britain. Although better regulation has
involved a fluid and rapidly changing discourse across the European Union, the
regulatory reform agenda has recently refocused on competitiveness, simplifica-
tion of targets and the reduction of administrative burdens on businesses. A
review of the evidence base on the impact of regulation on business performance
and the compliance behaviour of enterprises suggests that proposals relating to
environmental health in Britain have been overly influenced by ‘red tape’
discourse which lends disproportionate weight to claims relating to regulatory
burdens and underplays the benefits of regulation. Questions are raised with
respect to some key aspects of better regulation: the policy to shift resources from
enforcement to education; the limitations of comprehensive risk assessment
applied to targeting enforcement; uncertainties relating to the potential of
alternative means of achieving compliance and the adoption of good practice;
and the over-emphasis in simplification exercises on the achievement of narrowly
defined cost savings.
Keywords: regulation; European Union; risk assessment; environmental health;
regulatory impact assessment
Introduction
How regulatory compliance on the part of business organizations can most
effectively be secured while at the same time minimizing regulatory burdens and,
in so doing, contributing to the fuller realization of an ‘enterprise culture’ continues
to be the subject of considerable policy debate. The British government’s acceptance
of the recommendations of the Hampton Review (Hampton 2005) appears to have
created a dominant consensus as to the role to be played by regulatory agencies
charged with monitoring and enforcing organizational compliance with statutory
legal requirements. In essence, this consensus is centred on the notion that such
agencies should commit greater resources to the provision of advice and guidance
and reserve the use of the more ‘burdensome and expensive’ method of inspections
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to the small minority of ‘high-risk’ situations where its use is merited. This consensus
is premised on expectations relating to the potential of alternative means of
achieving compliance, including an increasing role for self-regulatory measures
and the greater involvement of non-state actors.
This article draws on secondary evidence to explore the policy dynamics behind
‘better regulation’ in Britain and the validity of this approach, with particular
reference to the implications for the regulation of environmental health risk in
smaller enterprises. It begins by summarizing the recent evolution of the policy
debate around better regulation. The main prescriptions of the Hampton report are
then summarized and their validity considered in relation to what is known about the
impact of regulation in general on businesses, enterprise compliance behaviour and
the increased role of risk assessment in targeting enforcement.
The origins of better regulation
The argument that regulation is a key barrier to business growth and performance
has received considerable attention in recent years (Baron 2002; FSB 2002; HM
Treasury 2002; IOD 2004; OECD 2002). Concerns in Britain reflect similar
experiences in a number of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s/1990s
of a so-called ‘regulatory crisis’ focused on alleged over-regulation (Hutter 2005),
with the policy debate leading to waves of initiatives concerned with ‘deregulation’,
‘smart regulation’ and ‘better regulation’. Current debates and developments
follow on from a longer-standing critique of ‘command and control approaches’
to regulation (Sinclair 1997), which are seen as being inefficient, expensive,
innovation-stifling and leading to enforcement difficulties. The critique of command
and control approaches has been widely accepted by policy-makers (OECD 2002)
and regulatory reform in European environmental health risk regulation (i.e.
including occupational health and safety, food safety and environmental risks) has
been driven over a number of years by the increasing application of ‘enforced self-
regulation’ (Braithwaite 1982; Fairman and Yapp 2005a). This involves regulators
setting goal-oriented responsibilities and duties for businesses to implement through
their own internal rules and procedures, rather than emphasizing detailed
prescriptive standards. Allied to this, enforcement practice has entailed the adoption
by inspectors of a discretionary use of the various methods of influence at their
disposal, as suggested by the ‘enforcement pyramid’ developed by Ayres and
Braithwaite (1992), where regulatory tools include a broad base of co-operative
measures such as persuasion, regulatory advice and technical consultations, but with
ongoing non-compliance met with a range of increasingly punitive measures.
In recent years, regulatory reform in Europe has been particularly influenced by
the Lisbon Agenda of the European Union (EU) for competitiveness (Commission
2005). In general terms, ‘better regulation’ covers a wide range of policy instruments
and programmes aimed at improving the capacity of institutions to provide high
quality regulation and to address issues of economic competitiveness, social cohesion
and sustainable development (Commission 2002). Regulatory impact assessment
(RIA) has been presented as a key tool by promoters of better regulation, although
some commentators have argued that RIA has been over-emphasized (Baldwin
2005). The alternatives to ‘traditional’ inspection and enforcement envisaged under
better regulation include a greater emphasis on auditing, greater self-regulation on
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the part of regulatees and an increase in the role of non-state actors in regulatory
regimes, whether ‘economic actors’ (businesses, trade associations, etc.) or ‘civic
actors’ (a range of non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups; Hood et
al. 2001; Hutter 2006). A number of commentators have further highlighted that
better regulation involves a fluid and rapidly changing discourse that allows political
leaders to respond flexibly to changing priorities in their regulatory reform agendas
(Baldwin 2005; Black 2005; Radaelli 2007). Radaelli (2007) redefines ‘better
regulation’ as ‘meta-regulation’  a malleable concept, involving sets of rules on
the process of rule-formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation. The
diffusion of new tools (such as RIA) and models of governance across Europe has
been uneven; thus Radaelli observes that the ‘better regulation’ agenda has tended to
oscillate over space and time between concerns over regulatory quantity (or
deregulation) and quality. In recent years, however, the pendulum appears to have
swung in favour of a more narrowly defined agenda for ‘jobs and growth’
(Commission 2005). Radaelli contends that, although focusing attention on specific
goals, such as the reduction of administrative burdens, this redefinition narrows the
scope of better regulation in terms of its sensitivity to the full range of stakeholder
concerns and its governance ambitions.
Better regulation in Britain
The British case presents a particularly dynamic example of the fluid and changing
nature of the better regulation agenda. A Deregulation Task Force was established in
1994 by the Conservative government, operating outside the main government
departments while being administered within the Cabinet Office. With the return of a
Labour government in 1997, the pendulum of the regulatory reform agenda
appeared to swing away from deregulation towards a greater emphasis on
consultation, transparency and regulatory quality. A Better Regulation Task Force
(BRTF) was established in 1997 and a Better Regulation Commission (BRC)
subsequently established to continue the role of the BRTF to advise the government
on regulatory proposals and its overall regulatory performance.
Despite this apparent change of emphasis, it is argued here that recent
developments in Britain are closer in spirit to the EU’s reformulated Lisbon agenda
for ‘jobs and growth’, with its new focus on competitiveness, simplification targets,
and the reduction of administrative burdens on businesses (Commission 2005;
Radaelli 2007). Indeed, with regard to working conditions and the regulation of
health and safety, some academics have pointed to the ongoing influence over a
number of years of a neoliberal rationality in transforming the British state and how
it relates to business (Beck and Woolfson 2000; Toombs 2006). Of particular
relevance are the economic objectives of the New Labour government, notably its
vision of building an ‘enterprise society’, and its stated aim of making Britain ‘the
best place in the world to do business’ (HM Treasury 2002). The policy framework
for a government-wide approach to promoting enterprise has been organized under
seven strategic themes, of which developing better regulation is just one (SBS 2002).
A particular dilemma presented by the small business sector is the large number
of such enterprises, which also needs to be seen in the context of the aim of
government to increase the rate of start-ups. There were an estimated 4.3 million
business enterprises in Britain at the start of 2005, and almost all of these (99.3%)
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were small (049 employees) and only 27,000 (0.6%) were medium-sized (50249
employees; DTI 2005). Small enterprises in Britain accounted for 46.8% of private
sector employment (including some of the most vulnerable workers) and 36.4% of
turnover, while small and medium-sized enterprises together accounted for 58.7% of
employment and 51.1% of turnover. Collectively, therefore, the environmental health
risks associated with smaller enterprises are considerable, while their large numbers
pose a particular problem for regulators in terms of how best to allocate scarce
resources to encourage compliance and the adoption of good practice in the control
of risk.
Important landmarks in the evolving debate on what might constitute better
regulation have been the report by Philip Hampton commissioned by the Treasury
(Hampton 2004, 2005) and a related report to the Prime Minister by the BRTF
(2005). Hampton considered the work of 63 national regulators and 468 local
authorities, which between them conduct more than 3 million inspections per year,
and, in the case of the national regulators covered, send out 2.6 million forms for
businesses to complete every year. The focus of this work was ‘to identify ways in
which the administrative burden of regulation on businesses can be reduced, while
maintaining or improving regulatory outcomes’ (Hampton 2005, p. 3). Over 300
stakeholders were consulted, including regulators and other relevant government
departments and agencies, local authorities, industry representative bodies, profes-
sional bodies, campaigning organizations, trade union bodies and academics.
Hampton made a number of recommendations with a view to achieving ‘greater
excellence in regulatory outcomes  but to do so substantially more efficiently, by:
. entrenching the principle of risk assessment throughout the regulatory system,
so that the burden of enforcement falls most on highest-risk businesses, and
least on those with the best records of compliance;
. in particular, ensuring that inspection activity is better focused, reduced where
possible but, if necessary, enhanced where there is good cause;
. making much more use of advice;
. substantially reducing the need for form-filling and other regulatory
information requirements; and
. applying tougher and more consistent penalties where these are deserved
(para. 24, p. 8).
The full and more consistent application of risk-based assessment, identified as an
essential mechanism for directing scarce regulatory resources, is expected to release
resources that can then be used ‘to provide improved advice, because better advice
leads to better regulatory outcomes, particularly in small businesses’. Thus,
Hampton identified that 36 of the 63 national regulators use some form of risk
assessment; ‘only 25 of them, however, include an explicit element of earned
autonomy, where good performers are visited less often, or have less onerous
reporting requirements’ (Hampton 2005 p. 4). The government subsequently
announced in the 2005 budget that the recommendations of the Hampton and
BRTF reports would be adopted in full, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer
endorsing Hampton’s recommendation of a major reduction in the number of
inspections by regulatory agencies by one million a year, or a third.1 In total, 35
agencies are to be reduced to just nine  a reduction of 26. These and other measures
were presented in the Chancellor’s speech as demonstrating how ‘Britain can lead the
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way in removing barriers to enterprise’ (Hampton 2005 p. 6). The recommendations
of the two reports have subsequently been incorporated in the Legislative and
Regulatory Reform Bill, published in January 2006.2
Even prior to Hampton, some of his main recommendations had already been
reflected in the policy statements of key regulatory agencies. The case for a more
risk-based approach to inspection had been made by the Health and Safety
Commission and a discussion article, ‘Regulation and recognition’ (2004), exploring
the best mix of methods subsequently published.3 The HSE has more recently
announced that the aim should be to achieve an ‘acceptable level of risk, not zero
risk’ and that this will involve a new approach to ‘sensible risk assessment’ (HSE
2006), also endorsed by the BRC as: ‘clearly an important development that has the
potential to trigger a profound culture change and re-think across the board’ (BRC
2007; see also BRC 2006). It is important to note, however, that risk assessment and
a targeted approach have long been used by the main agencies responsible for
environmental health regulation (e.g. HSE, 1986, pp. 3337; Hawkins 2002, p. 167)
and that they have supported a number of initiatives over the years aimed at
strengthening information provision and education to assist businesses to comply
with legal requirements. In the case of the HSE, this has included a telephone
helpline, supporting and encouraging better access to occupational health and safety
services, targeted campaigns and the production of a range of publications aimed at
small firms (Walters 2001, pp. 236238).
To further contextualize recent developments, research on the enforcement of
health and safety law has confirmed that the decline in inspections has, in fact, been
an observable trend for a number of years prior to Hampton (Unison/CCA 2002).4
This research also showed that levels of inspections, investigations and prosecutions
varied considerably by region and sector, while a further study (Unison/CCA 2003)
identifies considerable variation between local authorities (responsible for regulating
health and safety in lower-risk businesses). This evidence suggests that, rather than
representing a radical break, recent developments need to be understood as part of a
longer-term trend towards a declining role for inspection.
A number of studies have also been commissioned by regulatory agencies to
examine regulatory efficacy and the potential of alternative approaches for specific
areas of regulation (e.g. Howard and Galbraith 2004). The main alternatives
considered or under consideration include: a shift to auditing rather than inspection;
regulatory thresholds (i.e. excluding enterprises below a certain size); removing
regulations altogether; and alternative ways of achieving compliance/behavioural
change, including the wider adoption of voluntary codes, kitemarks, reputational
sanctions and positive incentives for good performers. A recent report on regulatory
sanctions (Macrory 2006) has recommended a more flexible and proportionate
approach with a broader range of sanctioning options being made available to
regulators in order to facilitate the implementation of Hampton’s agenda for risk-
based regulation.
It has been noted that there is limited experience of novel alternatives to ‘classic’
regulation (Fairman and Yapp 2005b, p. 33). Voluntary systems have been applied by
the Environment Agency in the case of waste minimization clubs during the 1990s
and recently by the English Regional Development Agencies.5 Positive incentives
have also been used by the Food Standards Agency in the form of food award
schemes, piloted in Wales and Northern Ireland; the scheme in Wales is reported by
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Hampton to be held in high regard by the catering industry, which believes the
awards add value to the recipient businesses (Hampton 2005, p. 42). Regional health
and safety representatives have been shown to be among the most powerful and
effective of intermediaries for supporting participative arrangements for health and
safety in small businesses. Positive experiences of this have been driven by legislation
in Sweden, Norway, Italy and Australia; whereas in Britain calls for such legislation
have been resisted by policy makers and efforts in this direction, although showing
some success, have been very limited in their breadth of coverage and sustainability
(see Walters and Nichols 2007, for a recent discussion of the evidence).
Following the acceptance of Hampton’s recommendations, a government-wide
Administrative Burdens Measurement Exercise has involved external consultants
measuring the costs associated with administrative tasks (form-filling, record-
keeping etc.) and estimating the total annual administrative cost contained in all
legislation in force before May 2005. Initial simplification plans have subsequently
been produced by the agencies concerned (Defra 2006; FSA 2006; HSE 2006) and by
December 2006 it was claimed that administrative burdens of around £14 billion had
been identified, with the government subsequently committing to reduce these
burdens by 25% or £3.5 billion (BRC 2007).
Many of Hampton’s proposals have been broadly welcomed, particularly those
relating to simplifying procedures, eliminating unnecessary bureaucracy and
adopting a systematic approach to RIA. Critical responses have been mainly from
the labour movement and particularly concerned with the implications for
occupational health and safety of the proposal to shift resources away from
inspection and enforcement towards education and advice (CCA 2004; TUC 2005)
and can be summarized as follows:
. that routine inspection should not be reduced since the credible threat of
inspection is held to be a key motivator of compliance;
. that inspection visits are essential to assessing risk including in apparently
‘low risk’ businesses (which should therefore not be exempted from inspec-
tions altogether), and that greater resources are therefore needed by regulators
for them to conduct more targeted and proactive inspections;
. that investigations of incidents and regulatory failures are also a crucial aspect
of any effective regulatory regime, but that regulators are currently insuffi-
ciently resourced to undertake such investigations.
Similar concerns had been expressed by the House of Commons Work and Pensions
Committee, following its investigation of the work of the Health and Safety
Commission and Executive, concluding in July 2004 that: ‘the HSE should not
proceed with the proposal to shift resources from inspection and enforcement to
fund an increase in education, information and advice’ and that ‘the evidence
supports that it is inspection, backed up by enforcement, that is most effective in
motivating duty holders to comply with their responsibilities under health and safety
law’ (HCWPC 2004, para. 142). The Committee also expressed concern over the low
levels of investigation of incidents and of proactive inspections and called for a
doubling in the number of inspectors. Such expressions of concern have had little
influence on policy: since 1997 the HSE’s workforce has fallen from over 4000 to its
current number of less than 3500, and the Department of Work and Pensions is
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proposing that the HSE should receive a 5% real-terms cut in its budget each year
from 20082009 to 20102011 (TUC 2008).
Enterprise and regulation: the evidence base
There is a diverse body of literature relevant to the debate, which this section draws
on to address the following key themes: the impact of regulations in general on
business performance; the compliance behaviour of enterprises; the role of risk
assessment in targeting enforcement; and the role of inspection.
Regulation and business performance
There is a considerable body of literature which addresses the impact of regulation
on business performance, some of which has been particularly influential on policy
(see Chittenden et al. 2002, and SBRC 2005, for two recent reviews of this literature).
Although Hampton (2005, p. 25) refers to a number of such studies, his report, at the
same time, acknowledges evidence that ‘Overall, the UK’s regulatory regime is well
respected internationally’ (para. 2.2). The policy emphasis on reducing regulatory
burdens therefore appears, through Hampton’s own acknowledgement, to fit
uneasily with evidence that the British regulatory environment in general is already
relatively ‘business-friendly’ compared with that in other countries (see also Nicoletti
and Scarpetta 2003; World Bank 2006). This apparent paradox has been noted in
two recent reviews of studies concerned with the impact of regulation on business
performance (SBRC 2005; Kitching 2006). These authors suggest that, despite the
growing body of literature on regulatory ‘burdens’, there is a need to take greater
account of the inadequate definitions of regulation typically used and also evidence
of inaccurate reporting of regulation-related costs.
Kitching (2006, p. 802) cites three surveys where ‘regulation’ is covered by the
broad concept of ‘legislation, norms, regulations, standards and taxation’ and points
out that norms and standards could apply to industrial, trade or commercial
customs, as well as regulatory requirements and guidance. He further argues that the
reported ‘burden’ of regulation has been amplified by the limitations of the survey
methodologies utilized, and a failure to investigate the precise nature of the causal
mechanisms through which regulation contributes to business-performance out-
comes. Many studies have therefore inevitably tended to reinforce the notion of
regulation as a constraint on business. Other studies, however, which have utilized
qualitative methods, have been more attuned to the complexities involved (e.g.
Edwards et al. 2002, 2004, in the case of employment legislation). Such studies show
that regulations generate a variety of consequences and that the emphasis on costs
and constraints is misconceived.
Notwithstanding these qualitative critiques of survey-based approaches, some
more sophisticated quantitative studies also lend support to the view that the effects
of regulation on business performance have been exaggerated in better regulation
discourse. The study by Carter et al. (2006) utilizes a large-scale biennial survey of
small business attitudes and opinions towards employment legislation undertaken on
behalf of the Federation of Small Business. Analysis of the survey data lends support
to the findings of qualitative studies on the impact of employment legislation: that
there is a difference between perceived potential effects and actual experience of such
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legislation; that regulations are not uniformly problematic; and that the effect of
legislation is mediated by competitive conditions, which are a greater influence on
firm performance. A further example is the study by Capalleras et al. (2007) which
looked at differences in start-up size and employment growth in new firms in highly
regulated (Spain) and less regulated (Britain) national economies.6 Despite sharp
differences in the regulatory approaches of the two countries, surveys of new firms in
the two countries showed more similarities than differences. The authors’ analysis
shows that the background and skills of firm founders are of greater significance
than regulation in influencing the performance of new and small firms. Other
econometric-based literature draws attention to the potential cost of misdirected
efforts at deregulation, including in terms of the danger of ‘excess entry’ of
‘inefficient’ and ‘lower quality’ firms and corresponding loss of welfare in the wider
economy (Ghosh and Saha 2007; Lahira and Ono 1988; Suzumura 1995). Such
studies lend support to the argument that well-designed and enforced regulatory
regimes have a positive role to play in improving economic efficiency and that the
dominant emphasis on lessening regulatory ‘burdens’ may not be the panacea it is
claimed to be by policy-makers and industry representatives.
Enterprise compliance behaviour
Hampton identifies advice as a key unmet need in current regulatory regimes and
that meeting this need will contribute to reducing the need for enforcement activity in
the form of inspection, referring to two studies to support this contention (EA 2002;
Yapp and Fairburn 2004). His report further observes that: ‘this lack of knowledge is
less a mark of failure by business, and more a mark of failure by regulators to
communicate their message’ (Hampton 2005, para. 2.53). However, closer examina-
tion of the evidence base on business compliance behaviour and responsiveness to
socio-economic influences suggests an alternative and more complex interpretation.
First, it is important to acknowledge that there is a lack of accurate information
on levels of compliance with legal requirements in general due to the methodological
difficulties involved (Lehmann Nielson and Parker 2006). Given these difficulties,
many studies rely on proxy measures of compliance while some also seek to explain
the causal factors involved in compliance and non-compliance. With regard to
smaller enterprises, there are numerous studies on specific aspects of regulation
which support the view that that non-compliance in such enterprises is prevalent.7
This prevalence has, in part, been linked to the more limited resources of small firms,
including restricted financial resources for investment in new plant, equipment and
training and also limited management time and skills for identifying and addressing
hazards and risks (Chittenden et al. 2002; Lancaster et al. 2003; Walters 2001). It has
also been linked to the low awareness of regulatory requirements among such firms
(Fairman and Yapp 2005a,b; Hillary 2000; Vickers et al. 2005). This widespread lack
of knowledge among small firms has been found to be compounded by the
difficulties they experience in understanding how the legal requirements relate to
their business and a tendency to conceive compliance differently to the view of
enforcers. Fairman and Yapp (2005a,b) therefore argue that enforced self-regulation
poses particular problems for many small businesses that lack the requisite systems-
based management approaches.
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Studies concerned with attitudes to environmental quality have found that small
business owner-managers often show very positive attitudes to the environment but
that this concern is typically not reflected in their behaviour (Petts et al. 1998;
Redmond et al. 2006; Schaper and Raar 2000; McKeiver and Gadenne 2005;
Williams et al. 2000). A recent review of studies concerned with environmental
proactivity, including participation in voluntary environmental programmes, iden-
tifies company size (as measured by the number of employees) as one of the most
influential structural affecting the implementation of environmental practices
(Gonzalez-Benito and Gonzalez-Benito 2006, pp. 9192). Compliance and the
adoption of compliance-related improvements have been noted to be better amongst
businesses which are more connected to external organizations and those that are
more generally receptive to external influences, such as directly through their
customers  notably in the case of food safety (Hutter and Jones 2006); through trade
membership, supply chain/franchise arrangements and taking courses (e.g. Lowrie
and Greenberg 1997 in relation to ground water contamination; Baldock et al. 2006
in relation to health and safety). Membership of industry associations and trade
groups is generally low, however, in smaller businesses (particularly in Britain).
Employees in small firms are also much less likely to be members of trade unions and
to have access to representative arrangements through which joint consultation over
health and safety matters can occur, a situation which several studies have identified
as being associated with higher rates of injury (Nichols et al. 1995, 2004). A range of
studies on occupational health and safety have further identified that small firms are
most responsive to direct contact techniques including inspection (Biggs and
Crumbie 2000; Davis 2004; Rakel et al. 1999; Wright et al. 2004).
A number of studies emphasize the heterogeneity of the small business sector and
that how enterprises respond to regulatory and other social pressures consequently
varies considerably according to their particular characteristics (i.e. the awareness
and motivation of owner-managers, and the capabilities and ‘culture’ of enterprises)
and their operational contexts (i.e. the competitive conditions they face, as
determined by the nature of product market and supply chain influences, as well
as their exposure to regulatory pressures and the public eye; Carter et al. 2006;
Edwards et al. 2002; Hutter and Jones 2006; Vickers et al. 2005). Thus, while
previous research supports the understanding that many small firms have a reactive
stance towards regulation, often expressing that they find it burdensome, it also
demonstrates how attitudes and motivations can range considerably from overt
rejection of the legitimacy of regulation and its avoidance to more positive and even
proactive stances that involve going ‘beyond compliance’, suggesting that responses
to newer ‘soft-regulation’ initiatives are, in turn, likely to vary considerably.
The increasing role of risk assessment in targeting enforcement
Hutter (2005) observes that the increasing use of risk-based tools appears to satisfy
the need for greater objectivity and transparency in making policy choices and aiding
decision-making; such tools are therefore regarded by policy-makers as particularly
helpful in resolving conflicts between different interest groups, and also providing a
transparent explanation of the allocation of resources. The more comprehensive
application of risk assessment to improve targeting of enforcement activity is, as
noted earlier, central to Hampton’s recommendations:
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The fundamental principle of risk assessment is that scarce resources should not be used
to inspect or require data from businesses that are low risk, either because the work they
do is inherently safe, or because their systems for managing the regulatory risk are good
(para. 2.13).
However, the review believes that no country at present has a fully comprehensive
approach to regulation, as is proposed in this report. While some countries use some
elements of risk assessment in their regulatory work, the review believes that the UK can
take a lead internationally by making comprehensive risk assessment the core element of
its regulatory system (para. 2.21).
Hampton suggests a number of principles for improving risk assessment, relating to
openness to scrutiny, balance, simplicity (with a preference for mathematical
expression), that it should be dynamic and incorporate deterrent effects, and should
‘always include a small element of random inspection’ (para. 2.31  emphasis added)
since: ‘This is important both to test the validity of the risk assessment, and to ensure
that businesses that are tempted to break the law always know they could be
inspected’ (para. 2.38).
Issues relating to enforcement and inspection in current and future strategies
have recently been explored by Sanderson and Brady (2006), using interviews with 19
senior managers responsible for regulation/enforcement strategy in various British
inspectorates. The salient points raised relate to:
. concerns over the methodological rigour of risk assessment and, in particular,
that by aggregating large numbers of small regulatees and focusing on higher
risks, there is a danger of an increase in the incidence of low-risk harms;
. the significance of a shift away from interaction in the form of routine
inspection and towards more of an audit approach, given that, historically,
improvement has often come about as a result of frequent contact between
inspectors and inspectees;
. that the increased emphasis on risk-based regulation potentially involves
greater political and reputational risks, i.e. in the case of incidents in
regulatees deemed by the new procedures as ‘low risk’, there will be a greater
tendency to ‘blame the regulator’ for poor operational judgement in not
assessing the relevant risks correctly.
These concerns exist alongside well-recognized limitations to risk-based and cost
benefit approaches in assessing what is an acceptable risk or cost, which suggest that
the simplification inherent in tools can result in the full complexity of problems being
underplayed. There is, for instance, a substantial body of work taking socio-cultural
perspectives on the perception of risk which challenges the distinction made in
earlier scientific/technical approaches between risks that are measurable and
unpredictable uncertainties (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2005). A number of studies
in the environmental field have pointed out that assessments of risk, cost and benefit
tend to favour a view that business costs are high, as the immediate costs to
businesses are always much easier to calculate than are the wider socio-economic
benefits (Yeager 1991). The potential limitations of risk-based and costbenefit
approaches applied to the targeting of enforcement, however, are largely unac-
knowledged in better regulation policy discourse, as represented by the Hampton
and BRTF reports.
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The role of inspection
Inspection has long been recognized as a key aspect of the regulation process.
Inspection regimes in Britain have tended, on the whole, to be particularly
sympathetic to the difficulties faced by smaller firms; a number of studies have
revealed the extent to which inspectors have long used advice, discretion and
flexibility, according to the nature of the business and the risks involved (e.g.
Hawkins 2002; Hutter 1997). This tendency to rely more on education and
persuasion rather than assumed wrong-doing and immediate recourse to punishment
at the beginning of the process is consistent with responsive regulation theory (Ayres
and Braithwaite 1992). While, as with regulation in general, inspection is seen as
performing an important role in deterring risky practices and behaviour, it is
potentially also concerned with catalysing improvement, including through recogni-
tion and praise for strengths (Day and Klein 1987; Braithwaite et al. 2007;
Sanderson and Brady 2006). Protection and improvement can therefore be seen as
two aspects of the same process in the context of what Sanderson and Brady (2006),
p. 3) describe as a ‘complex progressive definition of regulation’, in which inspection
is, potentially, an important change tool. Hampton does not acknowledge this aspect
of regulation, although he does emphasize  in line with ‘red tape’ discourse  the
danger of ‘over-compliance by nervous businesses’ as a result of ‘regulatory creep’
causing unnecessary administrative costs (Hampton 2004, p.6, para. 1.8).
While prescriptions for better regulation suggest that redirecting resources from
inspection to ‘education’ will lead to better regulatory outcomes, responsive
regulation theory draws attention to the importance of the interrelationship between
information channels, education and the enforcement function. This can involve
inspectors themselves acting as important sources of information and advice, as
previously noted, or inspection (or the threat of inspection) prompting the uptake of
alternative sources of information and advice, such as websites and telephone
helplines provided by regulators, and other non-regulatory sources (James et al.
2004). Thus, while there may be potential for innovative approaches to improving
levels of compliance, including better information and education and the involve-
ment of non-state actors, firms still need to be motivated to respond and to make use
of the available information. Some credible threat that wrong-doing will be detected
and proportionate sanctions applied is clearly crucial here.8 While the Macrory
(2006) report proposes the need for more flexible and proportionate sanctions, the
effective implementation of this is likely to be dependent on the efficacy of systems of
detection.9
There is therefore a strong case that innovative approaches need to be developed
alongside a strengthened inspection function rather than one that is reduced, albeit
ostensibly better targeted. Thus, there may be great scope for improving the
effectiveness of the existing inspection regime through complementary measures to
increase the role of other stakeholders. Griffith (2005), for instance, explores the
potential for improving the effectiveness of food safety inspections through making
inspection reports publicly available and the application of information technology
to the inspection process. He also notes the requirement for greater consistency and
transparency in inspections and enforcement  clearly contingent on the inspection
function being appropriately resourced.
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The important point to emphasize is that the issue of what might be a credible
level of random inspection in the context of better regulation is not addressed by
Hampton  other than the reference to a ‘small element of random inspection’ 
despite this being a key issue raised by a number of stakeholders and particularly in
the context of the decline of resources devoted to inspection and enforcement in
Britain over a number of years. A striking aspect of recent better regulation
discourse, moreover, is the one-dimensional approach to costs, in that the
demonstration of savings in administrative costs and decreases in regulatory
‘burdens’ on businesses have tended to be prioritized over improvements in levels
of compliance and the potential benefits in terms of reductions in injury, illness and
environmental damage.10
Understanding the varied responses of enterprises to regulation
Hampton and related policy statements from government appear to present a
simplistic conception of businesses’ compliance behaviour, with (a) a majority of
legitimate businesses who are well-intended towards legal requirements that they
view as being ‘reasonable’, and which are substantially compliant most of the time
(and in need of ‘better education’ rather than inspection, insofar as they are not
compliant) and (b) a small minority of ‘rogue traders’ needing greater regulatory
attention, this to be achieved by the adoption of more systematic approaches to
targeting enforcement measures and increased penalties for non-compliance. This
dualistic conceptualization of business compliance behaviour is consistent with the
perspective promoted by industry representative bodies towards which Hampton and
the British government have been particularly responsive.
A number of studies, however, have sought to explain responses to regulation by
way of a more differentiated understanding of the characteristics of enterprises and
the extent to which they are variously exposed to socio-economic and stakeholder
pressures. The stances adopted often involve a spectrum, ranging from resistant to
proactive; Tilley (1999), for example, identifies SME environmental strategies as
resistant, reactive, proactive or sustainable/ecological strategy. Similarly, previous
work on health and safety (Vickers et al. 2005) suggests a typology by which
enterprises can be differentiated in terms of their attitudes and responses towards
regulation: avoiders/outsiders (or ‘rogue traders’); reactors (including the sub-
categories of minimalists and positive responders); and proactive learners. Although
such typologies inevitably involve a degree of simplification of a complex and
dynamic reality, they do help to provide a more realistic understanding of the
behavioural and contextual factors that underlie different responses to regulation.
As previously noted, while it is not possible to precisely identify levels of legal
compliance, the available evidence suggests that enterprises that are most responsive
to ‘soft regulation’, and therefore effective as self-regulators, are likely to continue to
be in the minority, these being those who are most subject to effective stakeholder
influence or otherwise motivated to respond proactively to regulation as an
opportunity for improvement/innovation and the achievement of competitive
advantage. In contrast, most other small businesses will continue to struggle with
self-regulation and be most responsive to direct contact techniques (including
inspection) or, in a context of minimal enforcement or stakeholder influence, be
increasingly undeterred from routine recourse to ‘informal’ practices and associated
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non-compliance which, as well as increasing risk exposure to employees, the general
public and the environment, is a source of unfair competitive advantage against
those businesses which are more committed to regulatory compliance and the pursuit
of good practice.
In conclusion
This article has attempted to critically assess the validity of better regulation in the
context of environmental health risk regulation in smaller enterprises, focusing in
particular on the priority of the British government to reduce regulatory burdens
while at the same time ‘maintaining or improving regulatory outcomes’. The article
also identifies implications for the broader study of public policy. Clearly there are
positive aspects to better regulation, including the commitment to consultation
through open and transparent processes and a move to more flexible and
proportionate sanctions, as well as simplifying procedures and eliminating unneces-
sary bureaucracy. Nevertheless it has been overly influenced by ‘red tape’ discourse
which lends disproportionate weight to claims relating to the burden of regulation on
enterprises, oversimplifies the impacts on business performance and underplays the
benefits of regulation. Hence some campaigning groups and academics have
subsequently reiterated their concerns relating to the implications for workplace
health and safety of the reduced emphasis to be given to enforcement in the form of
inspections. The debate has been characterized by differing views (and interpreta-
tions of the evidence base) as to the extent to which regulation imposes an
unnecessary burden on businesses and the potential that there may be for alternative
approaches. Examination of the evidence base lends further support to critiques
made of the main suppositions underlying better regulation policy discourse by
raising questions relating to: the policy to shift resources from inspection and
enforcement to ‘education’; the limitations of comprehensive risk assessment applied
to targeting enforcement; uncertainties relating to the potential of alternative means
of achieving compliance and the promotion of good practice; and the over-emphasis
given in simplification exercises to the achievement of short-term financial cost
savings.
Further exploration and experimentation with regard to the introduction of more
effective approaches to achieving policy aims is clearly desirable. The danger is that
better regulation, as currently conceived, will tend to further encourage many
businesses to accord a lesser priority to (or continue to avoid) legal compliance and
the adoption of good practice in their pursuit of competitive advantage, increasing
risks to employees, consumers and the environment and associated long-term
economic cost. While this may well fulfil the government’s immediate aims in
relation to business and enterprise and with respect to reducing the financial costs of
regulation in the short term, questions clearly remain as to the desirability and
sustainability of the particular version of the ‘enterprise society’ that is being
endorsed and supported.
Finally, the article draws attention to the ongoing susceptibility of policy
processes to elite interests, notwithstanding professed commitments to evidence-
based policy and consultation. The findings therefore lend support to calls for the
need to strengthen the role of democratic deliberation in policy-making (Fischer
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2003) in a genuinely modernized policy arena in which ‘research evidence carries as
much weight as political faith’ (Burton 2006, p. 192).
Notes
1. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/budget/budget_05/bud_bud05_speech.cfm
2. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/111/en/06111x--.htm
3. http://www.hse.gov.uk/consult/condocs/cd-interventions.htm
4. Key findings include that the number of inspections of workplaces declined by 41% in the
five years to 2001  a decrease of 48,300; that a workplace registered with HSE currently
received, on average, an inspection once every 20 years; and that, in spite of increases in
the investigation of reported incidents over the previous five years, in 2000/2001 the vast
majority of major injuries to workers (80%) and to the public (93%) were not investigated.
5. Similar voluntary initiatives were investigated and promoted by the OECD across several
countries (e.g. OECD, 1993).
6. For instance, time needed to start up a business in Spain is 108 days compared with just 18
days in Britain; the cost of starting a business in the UK is 0.9% of gross national income
per capita in the UK compared with 16.5% in Spain (World Bank, Doing Business in
2005).
7. With respect to workplace safety, for instance, the under-reporting of major injuries is
considered to be significant (Daniels and Marlow 2005).
8. There is some existing evidence that regimes that depend on self-regulation are open to
abuse and difficult to maintain in the absence of explicit sanctions, e.g. in the case of the
chemical industry: see Gunningham (1995), King and Lennox (2000).
9. Macrory does not comment directly on this issue, although he does note the need for
greater follow-up of low-level enforcement actions than has been the case in the past (pp.
3233) while recognizing that the extent of follow-up activity has been constrained by the
resources available to individual regulators.
10. See, for instance, the responses of the BRC (2007) to the simplification plans of the main
agencies.
Notes on contributors
Ian Vickers is a senior lecturer and principal researcher at the Centre for Enterprise and
Economic Development Research, Middlesex University Business School.
References
Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J., 1992. Responsive regulation. Transcending the deregulation debate.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baldock, R., James, P., Smallbone, D., and Vickers, I., 2006. Influences on small firm
compliance related behaviour: the case of workplace health and safety. Environment and
planning C: government and policy, 24, 827846.
Baldwin, R., 2005. Is better regulation smarter regulation? Public law, Autumn, 485511.
Baron, R., 2002. The red tape menace. London: Institute of Directors.
Beck., M. and Woolfson, C., 2000. The regulation of health and safety in Britain: from old
Labour to new Labour. Industrial relations journal, 31 (1), 3549.
Biggs, D. and Crumbie, N., 2000. Characteristics of people working with chemical products in
small firms, Contract Research Report 278/2000. Norwich: The Health and Safety
Executive.
Black, J., 2005. The emergence of risk-based regulation and the new public risk management
in the United Kingdom. Public law, Autumn, 512548.
228 I. Vickers
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [M
id
dl
es
ex
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] A
t: 
14
:3
8 
12
 M
ay
 2
00
8 
Braithwaite, J., 1982. Enforced self-regulation: a new strategy for corporate crime control.
Michigan law review, 80, 14661507.
Braithwaite, J., Makkai, T., and Braithwaite, V., 2007. Regulating aged care: ritualism and the
new pyramid. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
BRC. 2006. Risk, responsibility and regulation. London: Better Regulation Commission.
BRC. 2007. The Commission’s independent assessment of simplification plans [online]. Available
from: http://brc.gov.uk/scrutiny/simplification_plans.asp.
BRTF. 2005. Regulation  less is more. Better Regulation Task Force. London: Cabinet Office.
Burton, P., 2006. Modernising the policy process: making policy research more significant?
Policy studies, 27 (3), 173195.
Capalleras, J.-L., Mole, K., Greene, F.J. and Storey, D.J., 2007. Do more heavily regulated
economies have poorer performing new ventures? Evidence from Britain and Spain, Journal
of international business studies, 117 [online]. Available from: http://www.palgrave-journals.
com/jibs/journal/vaop/ncurrent/index.html#29112007.
Carter, S., Mason, C. and Tagg, S., 2006. Small business owners’ perceptions and experience of
regulation. In: Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship Conference, 31 October to
2 November, Cardiff.
CCA. 2004. Hampton review: CCA’s initial response [online]. Centre for Corporate Account-
ability. Available from: http://www.corporateaccountability.org/regulation/main.htm.
Chittenden, F., Kauser, S., and Poutziouris, P., 2002. Regulatory burdens of small business: a
literature review. Sheffield: Small Business Service.
Commission. 2002. Action plan: simplifying and improving the regulatory environment.
Communication from the Commission, COM(2002)278 final, Brussels, 5 June 2002.
Commission. 2005. Better regulation for growth and jobs in the European Union. Communica-
tion to the Council and the EP, COM (2005)175, Brussels, 16 March 2005.
Daniels, C. and Marlow, P., 2005. Literature review on the reporting of workplace injury trends.
Buxton: Health and Safety Laboratory.
Davis, C., 2004. Making companies safe: what works?. London: Centre for Corporate
Accountability.
Day, P. and Klein, R., 1987. Accountabilities: five public services. London: Tavistock.
Defra. 2006. The Defra simplification plan: maximising outcomes, minimising burdens [online].
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs. Available from: http://www.defra.
gov.uk/corporate/regulat/pdf/simplification-plan.pdf.
DTI. 2005. SME Statistics UK 2005 [online]. Department of Trade and Industry. Available
from: http://www.sbs.gov.uk/sbsgov/action/layer?r.l27000000243andr.l17000000229andr.
stl&topicId7000011759.
EA. 2002. How green is small business? London: Environment Agency.
Edwards, P., Gilman, M., Ram, M., and Arrowsmith, J., 2002. Public policy, the performance
of firms, and the missing middle: the case of the employment regulations, and a role for local
business networks. Policy studies, 23 (1), 520.
Edwards, P., Ram, M., and Black, J., 2004. Why does employment legislation not damage
small firms? Journal of law and society, 31 (2), 245265.
Fairman, R. and Yapp, C., 2005a. Enforced self-regulation, prescription, and conceptions of
compliance within small businesses: the impact of enforcement. Law and policy, 27 (4), 491
517.
Fairman, R. and Yapp, C., 2005b. Making an impact on SME compliance behaviour: an
evaluation of the effect of interventions upon compliance with health and safety legislation.
Norwich: HSE Books.
Fischer, F., 2003. Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
FSA. 2006. Simplification plan 2006/7 [online]. London: Food Standards Agency. Available
from: http://www.food.gov.uk/foodindustry/betregs/
Policy Studies 229
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [M
id
dl
es
ex
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] A
t: 
14
:3
8 
12
 M
ay
 2
00
8 
FSB. 2002. Lifting the barriers to growth in UK small businesses. Federation of Small
Businesses.
Ghosh, A. and Saha, S., 2007. Excess entry in the absence of scale economies. Economic
theory, 30 (3), 575586.
Gonzalez-Benito, J. and Gonzalez-Benito, O., 2006. A review of determinant factors of
environmental proactivity. Business strategy and the environment, 15 (2), 87102.
Griffith, C.J., 2005. Are we making the most of food safety inspections? British food journal,
107 (3), 132139.
Gunningham, N., 1995. Environment, self-regulation and the chemical industry. Law and
policy, 19, 57109.
Hampton, P., 2004. Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement.
London: HM Treasury.
Hampton, P., 2005. Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement.
London: HM Treasury.
Hawkins, K., 2002. Law as last resort. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HCWPC. 2004. The work of the health and safety commission and executive. House of
Commons Work and Pensions Committee, Fourth Report of Session 200304, Volume 1.
London: The Stationery Office.
Hillary, R., ed., 2000. Small and medium enterprises and the environment. Sheffield: Greenleaf
Publishing.
HSE. 1986. Report by HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1985. Health and Safety Executive.
London: HMSO.
HSE. 2006. Simplification plan 2006/7 [online]. Health and Safety Executive. Available from:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/simplification/index.htm.
HM Treasury. 2002. Enterprise Britain: a modern approach to meeting the enterprise challenge.
London: HMSO.
Hood, C., Rothstein, H., and Baldwin, R., 2001. The government of risk. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Howard, M. and Galbraith, A., 2004. Factors influencing local authorities and enforcement
activity. Norwich: Health and Safety Executive.
Hutter, B.M., 1997. Compliance: regulation and environment. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hutter, B.M., 2005. The attractions of risk-based regulation: accounting for the emergence of
risk ideas in regulation. Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion Article no.
33. London School of Economics.
Hutter, B.M., 2006. The role of non-state actors in regulation. Centre for Analysis of Risk and
Regulation, Discussion Article no. 37. London School of Economics.
Hutter, B.M. and Jones, C., 2006. Business risk management practices: the influence of state
regulatory agencies and non-state sources. Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation,
Discussion Article no. 41. London School of Economics and Political Science.
IOD. 2004. Real impact of red tape. London: Institute of Directors.
James, P., Vickers, I., Smallbone, D., and Baldock, R., 2004. The use of external sources of
health and safety information and advice in the case of small firms. Policy and practice in
health and safety, 2 (1), 91104.
Kitching, J., 2006. A burden on business? Reviewing the evidence base on regulation and
small-business performance. Environment and planning C: government and policy, 24, 799
814.
King, A. and Lennox, M., 2000. Industry self-regulation without sanctions: the chemical
industry’s responsible care program. Academy of management journal, 43 (4), 698716.
Lahira, S. and Ono, Y., 1988. Helping minor firms reduces welfare. The economic journal, 98,
11991202.
Lancaster, R., Ward, R., Talbot, R., and Brazier, A., 2003. Costs of compliance with health and
safety regulations in SMEs. Norwich: HSE Books.
230 I. Vickers
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [M
id
dl
es
ex
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] A
t: 
14
:3
8 
12
 M
ay
 2
00
8 
Lehmann Nielson, V. and Parker, C., 2006. Is it possible to measure compliance? University of
Melbourne Legal Studies Research Article no. 92.
Lowrie, K.W. and Greenberg, M., 1997. Promoting ground water pollution prevention in small
businesses. Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 33 (1), 193204.
Macrory, R., 2006. Regulatory justice: making sanctions effective. London: Cabinet Office.
McKeiver, C. and Gadenne, D., 2005. Environmental management systems in small and
medium businesses. International small business journal, 23 (5), 513537.
Nichols, T., Dennis, A., and Guy, W., 1995. Size of employment unit and industrial injury rates
in British manufacturing. Industrial relations journal, 26 (1).
Nichols, T., Walters, D. and Tasiran, A., 2004. The relation between arrangements for health
and safety and injury rates  the evidence-based case revisited. Working Article 48. Cardiff:
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University.
Nicoletti, G. and Scarpetta, S., 2003. Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD evidence.
Economics Department. Working Article no. 347. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
OECD. 1993. Environmental policies and industrial competitiveness. OECD 2162/2342. Paris:
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OECD. 2002. Regulatory policy in OECD countries: from interventionism to regulatory
governance. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Petts, J., Herd, A., and O’hEocha, M., 1998. Environmental responsiveness, individuals and
learning: SME experience. Journal of environmental planning and management, 41 (6), 711
730.
Radaelli, C.M., 2007. Whither better regulation for the Lisbon agenda? Journal of European
public policy, 14 (2), 190207.
Rakel, H., Gerrard, S., Langford, I. and Shaw, K., 1999. Evaluating the impact of contact
techniques. HSE Contract Research Report 212/219. Sudbury: HSE Books.
Redmond, J., Walker, B. and Wang, C., 2006. Small business environmental management:
rhetoric or reality? In: 29th Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship Conference, 31
October to 2 November 2006, Cardiff.
Sanderson, P. and Brady, J., 2006. Current issues in UK inspection strategy: the observations
of directors of inspection. In: Regulation, inspection and improvement conference 2006: soft
law, soft regulation? The implications for regulatory practice, Anglia Ruskin University,
Cambridge.
SBRC Small Business Research Centre. 2005. Regulation and small firm performance and
growth: a review of the literature [online]. Small Business Service. Available from: http://
www.sbs.gov.uk/content/analytical/litreviewsmes.pdf.
SBS. 2002. Small business and government. London: Small Business Service.
Schaper, M. and Raar, J., 2000. Not so easy being green? Australian CPA, 71 (5), 4042.
Sinclair, D., 1997. Self-regulation versus command and control? Beyond false dichotomies.
Law and policy, 19, 527559.
Suzumura, K., 1995. Competition, commitment and welfare. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Taylor-Gooby, P. and Zinn, J., 2005. Current directions in risk research: reinvigorating the
social? University of Kent, Social Contexts and Responses to Risk Network, Working
Article no. 4.
Tilley, F., 1999. Small-firm environmental strategy: the UK experience. Greener management
international, 25, 6780.
Toombs, S., 2006. Regulating safety at work: what works? In: M. McConkey and P. Dutil, eds.
Dreaming of the regulatory village; speaking of the regulatory state. Toronto: The Institute of
Public Administration of Canada.
TUC. 2005. The Hampton Review and Health and Safety [online]. Trades Union Congress.
Available from: http://www.tuc.org.uk/h_and_s/tuc-9598-f0.cfm.
Policy Studies 231
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [M
id
dl
es
ex
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] A
t: 
14
:3
8 
12
 M
ay
 2
00
8 
TUC. 2008. TUC evidence to work and pensions select committee into the work of the HSE and
HSC [online]. Available from: http://tuc.org.uk/h_and_s/tuc-14176-f0.cfm.
Unison/CCA. 2002. Safety last? The under-enforcement of health and safety law. London:
Unison/Centre for Corporate Accountability.
Unison/CCA. 2003. Safety lottery  how the level of enforcement of health and safety depends on
where you live. London: Unison/Centre for Corporate Accountability.
Vickers, I., James, P., Smallbone, D., and Baldock, R., 2005. Understanding small firm
responses to regulation: the case of workplace health and safety. Policy studies, 26 (2), 149
169.
Walters, D., 2001. Health and safety in small enterprise. Oxford: PIE Peter Lang.
Walters, D. and Nichols, T., 2007. Worker representation and workplace health and safety.
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Williams, H., van Hooydonk, A., Dingle, P., and Annadale, D., 2000. Developing tailored
environmental management systems for small businesses. Eco-management and auditing, 7,
106113.
World Bank. 2006. Doing business in 2006: creating jobs. Available from: http://www.doing
business.org/documents/DoingBusiness2006_fullreport.pdf.
Wright, M., Marsden, S., and Antonelli, A., 2004. Building an evidence base for the Health and
Safety Commission Strategy to 2010 and beyond: a literature review of interventions to
improve health and safety compliance. Sudbury: HSE Books.
Yapp, C. and Fairburn, R., 2004. The evaluation of effective enforcement approaches for food
safety in SMEs. London: Food Standards Agency.
Yeager, P., 1991. The limits of the law: the public regulation of private pollution. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
232 I. Vickers
